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ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO VIRGINIA 
Clarence Jung 
1987-5 
ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO VIRGINIA 
A Working Paper 
I. Introduction 
Conditions in the property and casualty insurance industry in the 
past several years have caused great concern to both the insureds and 
the insurers. Premium rates for some lines, particularly certain 
liability coverages, have increased significantly (some observers would 
say catastrophically). For some businesses and governmental units 
insurance coverages have either been cancelled or are not available. 
The situation in the industry has often been referred to as a 
crisis. And reactions to this crisis have included calls for investiga-
tions of the industry and an increased degree of government regulation. 
Private citizens and business firms have blamed insurance companies; 
insurance companies have blamed the legal system; representatives of the 
legal system tend to blame the insurance companies and so on. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the nature of this problem; 
its dimensions; its probable future direction and possible remedies; and 
the manner in which it is being dealt with in Virginia. 
II. Dimensions of the Problem 
The origin and extent of this problem are not easily defined. It 
apparently began to be evident around 1983 or 1984, and was widely felt 
in 1985 and 1986. Much of the evidence is anecdotal - coming from risk 
managers for corporations or governmental bodies and to some extent from 
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ordinary consumers - and not easily quantified. Nonetheless it has been 
so widely reported that there is hardly any question that it is a 
legitimate problem. 
That the price and availability of property and casualty insurance, 
particularly liability insurance, are severe problems of industry and 
government is indicated by a survey initiated in 1986 (and repeated in 
1987) by the Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc. - RIMS - asking 
its members to evaluate current insurance conditions. The members of 
this society are the risk managers (meaning the people who buy insurance 
and try to minimize the cost of risk exposures) for businesses and 
governments throughout the country. 
The two surveys - in January 1986 and January 1987 - showed that 
there was "sharp deterioration of conditions ••• starting in 1985, 
giving way to a less rapid deterioration in 1986 and, in some cases, 
actual improvement." (RIMS 1987 Insurance Availability Survey, 1987, 
p.3) For example Table 1 (taken from Appendix B of the report) 
indicates that for Umbrella/Excess Liability coverage there were 
virtually no premium increases or lowered limits of coverage in first 
quarter of 1984, but the third quarter of 1985 found 83% of the 
respondents reporting premium (i.e., price) increases of over 100% and 
one-third of the respondents reporting limits decreases of over 50%. 
That the "crisis" seems to be easing somewhat is shown by 4th quarter 
1986 figures of only 6% of the companies facing such price increases and 
only 4% facing large decreases in limits. Coverage restrictions seem to 
have been continuing (in a somewhat erratic way) in 1986. 
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The RIMS data cited above indicate why so much concern was 
generated throughout the country about the price and availability of 
property and casualty (in particular, liability) insurance in the 
mid-1980s. This concern was reflected in legislation in virtually every 
state in the union, as well as by studies by the General Accounting 
Office and by congressional investigations. In Virginia, an 
organization calling itself Virginians for Law Reform was created and 
the Attorney General issued a call for state regulation of insurance 
rates and attention by the Commonwealth's Bureau of Insurance to levels 
of profits of insurance companies doing business in Virginia. The AG's 
concerns were in turn reflected in two laws passed in the 1987 General 
Assembly aimed at increased regulation of the industry. 
These laws (Hl234 and Hl235) require that the Bureau of Insurance 
conduct a survey of the industry each year as to availability, price and 
coverages of all lines of insurance. Based on an analysis of these 
data, the Bureau is to determine whether there are "troubled" lines. 
Hearings would then be held and the Bureau would determine whether the 
competition is effective. If it is not, then prior approval (i.e., 
regulation) would be required. 
Because the insurance industry is exempt from federal regulation 
(and from the antitrust acts), whatever regulation comes about is at the 
state level and so it may be instructive to look at the nature of 
regulation in the Commonwealth of Virginia as it reflects regulation 
throughout the national economy. As background, there is set out in the 
next section of this working paper a discussion of the important factors 
in the insurance markets as these factors determine_ price, availability 
and coverages in this industry. 
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III. Nature of Insurance Markets 
A. An Overview 
This section represents an attempt to summarize the workings of the 
industry as these activities generate coverages and determine prices and 
availability. 
Obviously, but with some not-so-obvious subtleties, the insurance 
industry attempts to identify customers who need insurance coverages and 
who will be "profitable." This leads the industry to seek geographic 
and industry targets which will be profitable and so to "underwrite" 
customers in these markets that profits are earned. Thus, the first 
element in the insurance equation is: Underwriting Profit/Loss. The 
search for profitable underwriting will generate different results for 
different lines and for different locations. (Representatives of states 
or industries where underwriting profits seem large may, then, in fact 
protest these decisions - as did the Attorney General of Virginia in 
1987; see testimony of February 2, 1987.) 
Since the dollar volume generated by the sale of insurance policies 
is meant to cover losses that will extend over quite a period of time, 
the companies "reserve" some portions of these premiums for the payment 
future losses. Just how much is reserved and how these reserves are 
accounted for are topics that generate much discussion and disagreement. 
Questions arise as to whether reserves should be committed for losses 
greater than actually experienced (even actuarially) because of the weak 
link between past experience and future losses (see the GAO report on 
general liability); whether the amounts reserved should be decided using 
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the present value of future losses or their actual estimated dollar 
value. And some critics of the industry argue that even unrealized 
capital gains on the insurance company's portfolio should be counted as 
income. (In this connection, see the ISO report.) 
The process of economic adjustment in the industry appears to 
follow the classic "cobweb" model. This is a model, generally 
attributed to Mordecai Ezekiel in the 1930s, the interaction of supply 
and demand forces in an industry characterized by a gestation per~od on 
the supply side. Of course, the production of most goods (and often, 
services) requires . some gestation period, but .is most graphical _ly 
illustrated in the field of agriculture where gestation often has a 
literal interpretation. 
The cobweb is illustrated in the figure on,. t;he fac~ng P<;lge e:tnd. has 
now become a part of most Principles courses. In time period 1, the 
price is such that the quant~.ty d~man?~.d, p_oint._A.r:_iJ>_ t~s~t,h_~-·~• ·\ 
' quantity supplied, but supply lags demand by one period. ~hv~ ~p period 
2, the quantity supplied is at point Bon the supply curve (now meaning 
that "supply exceeds demand") so the price drops, point C. The drop in 
price causes a drop in quantity supplied in the next period, point D, 
and so on. 
What such a model shows is that even an industry characterized by 
pure competition can generate cycles in price and output behavior. 
Broadly interpreted, the model gives a feel for the cyclical nature of 
the property and casualty insurance industry. Of course, the variables 
are more complex than in the simple model - incorporating as they do, 
premium rates, underwriting experience, investment income, and various 
s 
expenses of doing business - but the process is well exemplified by the 
cobweb. 
A major force in the industry is the often little-noticed, but 
highly important, field of reinsurance (and to some extent excess lines 
insurance). As the name implies, reinsurance is insurance written for 
insurance companies by reinsurers. Companies will write policies for 
their customers and then will "lay off" various strata, retaining only 
what they consider manageable exposures. This market seems to move in 
mysterious ways, with Lloyds of London always appearing to be the basic 
force in the industry. And - what is most important - the trail of 
justification for the "difficulties" of the industry always seems to 
disappear into the mists of that industry. (This, it appears, is an 
area that might fruitfully be researched - perhaps it already is.) 
Overarching the performance of this industry is the regulatory 
power of government1 government, that is, at the state level. Well 
before the spate of interest in "deregulating" all sectors of the 
economy, the idea of allowing competition to regulate insurance markets 
had become widespread among many states. Exhibit.!!. shows the regulatory 
status for each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. The 
focus of this paper is, in fact, on identifying the role of the state 
regulatory bodies in influencing the performance of the industry. That 
topic will be addressed in the next section. However, it may be useful 
first to outline some of the major points of disagreement among 
interested parties with respect to measuring that performance. 
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B. Issues in the Measurement of _ Industry Performance. 
This sub-section summarizes some of the major issues on which 
interested parties disagree in measuring the industry's economic health 
and its contribution to society. 
First, and possibly foremost, there is the question of measuring 
the expenses of the industry, in particular its loss experience. There 
are, of course, actual losses paid out, about which there is little or 
no question. But there are also losses incurred but not reported 
(IBNR). The industry tends to report losses in terms of estimates of 
what the companies will 'Tventually be liable for. If measured, however, 
in terms of actual cash pay outs, the amounts will be considerable 
lower. (See Attorney Mary Sue Terry's testimony, largely supplied by 
Dr. John w. Wilson.) 
Second, there is the question of whether to take account of the 
"present value" of future losses. E.g., a thousand dollars to be paid 
out ten years from now has a present value of about five hundred dollars 
if the rate of interest is seven percent. Thus, the true economic cost 
to an insurance company of paying a future claim is its present value. 
The Internal Revenue Service has in fact ordered companies to value 
losses on this basis, although for rate making purposes companies still 
use actual cash value of the estimated required reserves. 
Having established that reserves in some amount are needed (though 
the exact amount is open to various interpretations) the companies find 
themselves with liquid resources that are then invested in various 
income-producing investments. For rate-making purposes, companies often 
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tend to look at the underwriting experience alone and to try to use 
actuarial data to establish rates that will yield an underwriting 
profit. However, in terms of corporate policy, companies consider 
investment income and realized capital gains to be a part of their 
income stream. Some observers even argue for the inclusion of 
unrealized capital gains in estimates of insurance companies profits on 
the ground that "some day" these will be in fact realized. However, 
this is almost certainly a minority view and would probably not be 
recognized by financial analysis and economists. 
Underwriting policies constitute a third area about which there is 
disagreement, in this case as to what constitutes appropriate behavior 
from a social point of view. There are two dimensions to this area. 
First, the extent to which policy holders in one geographic area, or 
class of insured, are generating profits for the company while other 
areas or classes are receiving what some observers term a subsidy. 
Second, and closely related to the first, the question of availability -
oftentimes a measure of the "tightness" of the market, as for example 
when more drivers go into the assigned risk category for automobile 
insurance. 
IV. Approaches to Evaluation of Industry Performance 
Any evaluation of industry performance must begin with a review of 
the market structure of the industry. Market structure is measured by 
the number of firms in the industry, the ease of entry and exit of new 
firms, and the degree of product differentiation. 
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In applying these criteria to a particular industry, broad measures 
of judgment and economic theory must be introduced. For example, 
industries may be more competitive than the raw data would indicate if 
they can be called "contestable" markets. That is, if there are 
potential competitors who are indeed potential - will in fact come into 
the market - then the industry can be said to be competitive and the 
forces of the marketplace should lead to socially optimum levels of 
prices, costs, and output. 
For the insurance industry, the focus is on the level of prices 
(premiums), the availability of coverages, profitability of the firms 
and their solvency. The question is whether the industry is 
sufficiently competitive that coverages are available at prices which 
enable companies to remain solvent and yet produce only a "reasonable" 
rate of return. If so, then there is no need for government regulation. 
If not, then the state should regulate the industry. 
But there are powerful cyclical forces at work in the insurance 
industry, as was noted earlier. Thus, any evaluation of industry 
performance must be done with a time perspective that is capable of 
accounting for these forces. 
Furthermore, measurement of the adequacy of reserves and of the 
level of industry profit is subject to wide areas of judgment and 
interpretation. 
One approach to an economic evaluation of the industry would appear 
to be, therefore, that of examining the availability, price, 
profitability and solvency for particular lines, over a time period long 
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enough to capture the cycle and for a set of states which have differing 
regulatory schemes. A review of such a data set, along with information 
on market structure of the industry, nationally and by state, should 
yield a useful assessment of industry performance. 
Some lines of insurance seem to be more amenable to such an 
analysis than others. For example, the automobile line seems to 
generate data and to be sufficiently established so that the analysis 
seems plausible and relevant. Data and conditions in others lines - for 
example, professional liability insurance coverage for physicians and 
lawyers - is subject to wide areas of disagreement. 
Section V, below, represents an attempt to apply this approach to 
two lines of insurance in the Virginia market - automobile and lawyers 
malpractice. 
v. Application to Virginia 
For automobile liability insurance, there is a readily available 
measure of "availability" - the number of new assignments in the 
assigned risk market - which clearly shows the cyclical nature of the 
industry. 
Figure 1 depicts the number of new assignments, by year, 1968 to 
1987. Regression analysis yields the trend line indicating a long-run 
downward trend of 3,500 assignments per year. The cyclical nature of 
the business is clear from this graph. In the mid-1980s, the number of 
new assignments is up sharply from previous years thus indicating, to 
some extent, that automobile insurance is not as readily available as it 
10 
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Table 2 
New Entrants into the Assigned Risk Pool 
as Lagged Response to Industry Net 
Income as Percent of Premium 
Indus.try Net New Ass. i gnmen ts 
(1,000s) 
1968 - 4.6¾ 
1969 - 3. r-' 
1983 - 2.5¾ 
1984 - -3.1¾ 
1985 - -4. ~/4 
1971 - 122 
1972 - 146 
1986 - 106 
1987 - 140 
1988 - 130 
(estimate) 
(forecast) 
From the data above, the regression equation is 
'· 
New Assignments= 132 - 3.91x(Net Income) 
Adjusted R-squared is 20.7" 
was. It is important to note that this is a cyclical phenomenon, and 
that the cycle should turn down at some point in time. Thus - the data 
do not argue that regulation would solve the "availability" problem. 
Table 2 reflects an attempt to obtain at least a rough 
approximation of the time lags involved in the cycle. Net income for 
the industry as a percent of the premium dollar is used as a leader for 
new assignments in the Virginia market. With a three-year lag, there is 
a negative (i.e., correct algebraic sign) relationship between profits 
and new assignments (profits down - new assignments up) and the 
coefficient of correlation is significant, though not high. 
Set out below is a single-equation model designed to test whether 
government regulation makes a significant difference in the price of 
automobile insurance. 
P = 311 -5.44 Y - 0.1 R + 6.35 S 
(-1.98) (0.00) (2.62) 
P - average premium by state 
Y - average industry profit by state 
R - legislation by state (regulated or not regulated) 
S - state population 
The parameters in this equation were determined by multiple 
regression analysis for all fifty states plus the District of Columbia. 
While the coefficient of correlation for the function is quite low, size 
of state population is significant and profit is marginally significant 
while the existence of regulation (a dummy variable) is not significant. 
This equation offers fairly convincing evidence that regulation (more 
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precisely, prior approval by the state bureau of insurance rates) is not 
a significant factor in determining the price of automobile liability 
insurance. 
The evidence just presented deals with availability, price, and 
profitability in the context of regulation. Solvency does not appear to 
be a problem in the industry today nor has it been for a number of 
years. In the early part of this century, there was such a problem and 
that indeed was the motivation for earlier regulatory programs. Today, 
however, there are state Guaranty Funds (much like the FDIC) to which 
all companies contribute and which seem to be effective. 
For the automobile insurance line, the evidence seems strong that 
competition is an effective regulator of the industry. While the 
evidence presented above must be firmed up and expanded, it is pretty 
clear that this will be the result. A comprehensive study by 
Litzenberger and Nye "Level of Competition in the California Private 
Passenger Automobile Insurance Market" (at Wharton and Stanford) draws a 
similar conclusion, using an analysis primarily in terms of market 
structure. 
With respect to the liability market in general and certain lines 
in particular (such as professional liability, directors and officers, 
nursery schools and others) the picture is not as clear. One study, by 
Kathleen Carlson of Northeast Illinois University, finds that there is 
no evidence that prior approval (i.e., state regulation on a public 
utility basis) is effective - or conversely that competitive forces are 
not effective - in several major lines of insurance. Her methodology 
12 
was interesting. She asserts that the higher the loss ratio to premiums 
paid, the better - that is, the more money the "customers" are getting 
back. (To employ such one-dimensional analysis seems patently 
incomplete, but it is an interesting thesis.) Employing fairly routine 
tests of significance Ct-test), she found that these ratios are 
independent of the form of state regulation. 
Her methodology is, in fact, similar to the one I used in 1980 
working with the Bureau of Insurance (and up-dated in Equation above) 
in devising a single equation model of price (i.e., premium) as a 
function of relevant variables including the state regulation of rates 
as a dummy variable. 
However, a reading of the record of recent years suggests that, as 
indicated above, the answer is more complex for a number of lines. The 
severe problems of availability, huge increases in premiums and reduced 
coverages of recent times (1) all argue for caution in drawing such a 
conclusion for lines other than automobile, fire and allied lines. 
It appears, here, that several factors militate against the 
industry and its customers. These factors center on two areas: one, the 
seemingly large increases in court awards against the insureds and the 
insurance companies some having a very "long tailn (the term standing 
for the fact that the time between premium payment and paying for a loss 
is always finite, and sometimes very "long"). As a result, insurance 
companies tend to nreserven heavily against these losses; two, the 
apparent problems experienced in the reinsurance markets, which 
(1) See the allusion earlier to the RIMS study on availability. 
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problems are always referred to as being like an act of God and perhaps 
only understandable to the cognezeti. 
Of these two factors, this study leaves the reinsurance market (and 
related, excess lines fields) for future research. It is a topic that 
would seem to be ripe for research. The second is one on which data 
seem to be available even though their meaning and implications are far 
from clear. 
The "reserving" policies of insurance companies appear to be the 
foundation of much of the presentation by Attorney General Mary Sue 
Terry on proposed changes in insurance regulatory laws in Virginia in 
February, 1987. In her paper, the attorney general argued that much of 
the large underwriting losses claimed by the industry are not, in fact, 
losses but result from "companies' setting aside large loss reserves." 
(1) Exhibits 3 and 4 from her report (attached to this working paper) 
indicate that reported losses on general liability insurance in Virginia 
ran 47.2\ of the premium dollar whereas on an actual cash basis the 
figure was 14.9\. Both these figures are considerably higher for the 
United States, arguing (in the Attorney General's opinion) that 
companies are making a profit on Virginia business and are making 
Virginians "subsidize" operations in other states. Whether are not the 
argument about Virginia business being profitable is legitimate, it does 
appear that insurance companies are tending to "reserve" heavily -
perhaps because of the perception of an increasingly litigious society, 
and the possibility of totally unexpected claims. 
Data are just being developed bearing on these markets. Acts of 
the General Assembly in 1987 require the Bureau of Insurance to survey 
14 
companies each year to determine whether there are "troubled lines." 
These survey results have just been returned to the Bureau and will be 
analyzed by a staff member there (Lee Reaves). I have been promised 
that I could see the data, the analysis, and try to contribute to the 
analysis. 
A particular line that is of considerable interest at the present 
time is that of Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance. The Virginia 
Trial Lawyers Association conducted a survey of their members and were 
absolutely amazed at the number of responses and (very often) the 
vehemence of the comments. These results are not quantified yet (it is 
uncertain whether it would be useful to "quantify" them) but it is clear 
that the legal profession feels aggrieved by the insurance industry. 
The State Corporation Commission held hearings on this matter, sent 
interrogatories to law firms. The discoveries (i.e., answers) are being 
gathered now. A hearing will be held on October 1 on the matter of 
regulation of this line by the Bureau of Insurance (i.e., requiring 
prior approval). 
The Bureau of Insurance in hearings held March 24, 1987 argued that 
"there is sufficient competition in Virginia to allow competitive 
rating of lawyers professional liability insurance based on the fact 
that there are seven companies actively seeking to write the 
business ••• " (p. 14 of the hearings). In an analysis of this question 
by Dr. John W. Wilson, economic consultant retained by the Trial 
Lawyers, dated June 26, 1987 argued that the insurance companies are 
"over-reserving" and that lawyers liability insurance is unduly 
15 
profitable to the insurance companies; therefore, regulation by the 
state is needed. 
VI. Direction of Future Research 
What my review has shown, I believe, thus far is that competitive 
forces are still good regulators of the insurance for much of the 
insurance business written in Virginia - e.g., private passenger 
automobile insurance, fire and allied lines. However, for a good 
portion of the industry, as indicated in the preceding two paragraphs, 
there is much more to be done. 
The more interesting, and currently important, questions are those 
pertaining to general liability insurance for business and some special 
lines, especially lawyers professional liability insurance. To a 
considerable degree the data are just now coming in on this for the 
Commonwealth of Virginia. That is, the survey conducted by the Bureau 
pursuant to the General Assembly legislation of 1987, and the hearings 
and procedures on lawyers insurance. 
As these materials come in, my aim will be to try to find 
quantitative measures of availability, price profitability (and to some 
degree, solvency) for these areas. Also, to try to devise some single-
equation models for these lines like those devised for automobile 
insurance. Possibly, also it will be useful to study the whole field of 
the role of tort law, numbers of cases filed, amounts of awards and so 
on. Possibly, also to devise a simultaneity model for the automobile 
field. 
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insurance and "Im" to Mdical aalpractlce .. l•~~r-u~~i\~~:ff.iifM..tB~f:~ 
are an integral part of the cbart. 
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MANDATORY 
PRIOR STATB KADE BUREAU COMPETITIVE 
STA.TB APPROVAL RATES RATES RATING 
ALAIWIA p &. cl 
ALASICA p &. C 
. ARIZONA p & C 
ARKAHSAS P&C 
CALIFORNIA p & C 
COLORADO p & C 
CONHECTICUT p & C 
DELAWARB p & C 
D. C. C p 
FLORIDA p & C 
GIORGIA p & C 
HAWAII p & C A2 
IDAHO P&C 
ILLINOIS3 
•INDIANA p & cl 
IOWA p & C 
lAHSAS p & C 
JC!NTUCff P & c4 
LOUISIANA cl pS 
KAINE p & C 
J!ARYLAHD P & c6 
MASSACHUSETTS p & C A; 11117 
MICHIGAN p & C A & H8 
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MANDATORY 
PRIOR STATE KA.DE BUREAU COMPETITIVE 
STATE APPROVAL RATES RATES RATING 
MINNESOTA p & C 
MISSISSIPPI C p 
MISSOURI p & C 
MONTANA p & C 
NEBRASKA p & C 
NEVADA P&C 
NEW HAMPSHIRE P&C 
NEW .JERSEY p & C CL9 
NEW MEXICO P&C 
NEW YORI( AlO ·p & C 
NORTH CAROLINA A & pll p 7 C 
NORTH DAJCOTA p & C 
OHIO p C 
OICLAHOKA p & C 812 
OREGON P&C 
PENNSYLVANIA p & C 
RHODI.ISLAND p & C 
SOUTH CAROLINA P&C 
SOUTH DAICOTA P,&·;C :.j~·c~~i 
TENNESSEE P&C CLJ..3..jr;: ~ '. ~~~·;,r:--z. 
.TEXAS C p & ,.1• 
rnll 
UTAH 
VERMONT 
VIRGINIA 
WASHINGTON 
WEST VIRGINIA 
WISCONSIN 
WYOMING 
PRIOR 
APPROVAL 
p & C 
p & C 
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STATE KADI 
RATES 
KAHDATORY 
BUREAU 
RATES 
COMPETITIVE 
RATING 
p & C 
p & clS 
p & c16 
CL17 
P&C 
P&C 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Approval is not required if the rate filing involves no change in the 
expense provisions. This type of rate law is comonly referred to as 
"modified prior approval". Administration of the law may be uneven. 
2. Hawaii's competitive raUng law applies only to compulsory auto 
liability and no-fault insurance. Originally scheduled to terainate on 
August 1, 1983, the law was made permanent during the 1982 legislative 
session. 
3. Illinois has no general rating law for property and casualty insurance. 
Separate regulatory provisions apply to workers' compensation and 
involuntary market rates. 
4. lten tucky • s competitive rating law applies to workers• compensation 
insurance as well as to property and casualty lines generally. The law 
took effect July 15, 1982. 
5. Deviations from bureau-made rates must be approved. 
6. Maryland's competitive rating law becaae effective on July l, 1984. It 
will ezpire on July 1, 1986 unless eztended. 
7. Rates for medical malpractice insurance are annually fized and 
established by the comisssioner. (C. 175A, SSA). Rates for automobile 
insurance are subject to prior approval rating laws (Chapter 175E)i 
however, the coamissioner bas fixed and established rates for private 
passenger automobile insurance since January 1, 1978. 
8. Michigan•• competitive rating law for private passenger automobile .and 
homeowners insurance establishes specific requir ... nts for / 
cla11ification1 and territorial base rates. It al •o forbids Insurers 
froa making rates or rating clas1ifications for automobile insurance 
ba1ed upon sez or aarital status. However, rate • aaJ be put into effect 
without being subject to a waiting period or prior approval. 
9. Rates for c011111ercial line• of insurance, other than for "special risu" 
as defined by statute, aust be filed within 30 daJ • of the effective 
date. No fil _ing requlreaants apply to "special rhu". · · · · 
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10. lat•• for private paaaenger automobile• and veblcle1 for hire (including 
bu••• and 1cbool bu•••> are aubject to prior approval. Tb• c011petltlve 
rating law appli•• to rat•• for all other automobile lnaurance lln••· 
It will ezpire on Kay 15, 1986 unl••• eztended by the leglalature. 
11. Rate• for private paaaenger automobile in1urance and realdentlal real 
property (defined by statute) are aade by a 1tatutory rating bureau. 
12. Oklabomais competitive rating law applies only to 
dwelling fire insurance, including fara coverage. 
to teralnate on January l, 1984, tbe law was made 
1983 legl1lative 1e11ion. 
homeowners and 
Originally acheduled 
permanent during the 
13. Tennes1ee'1 competitive rating law for coamerclal lines of insurance -
took effect on October 1, 1983. Rates for personal risk insurance 
continue to be subject to prior approval. 
14. Th• approval of the Tezas State Board 11 required for deviation• from 
state-made rates. 
15. Vermont's competitive rating law became effective on July 1, 1984. The 
law contain• special provisions for workers' compensation insurance, 
including a prohibition of schedule rating. 
16. Rates for uninsured motorist coverage must be approved before use. 
17. Since March 1, 1982, rate filing procedures for conmercial insurance 
lines have been modified by administrative order to remove prior 
approval requirements. (Administrative Code, S284-24-060). 
Exhibit 3 
General Liability Insurance - Virginia 
Summary of 1985 Reported Operating Results*/ 
LAX 
(12.7%) 
Other Expenses 
(24%) ----
• 
-/ Loaes and Loa Adjustment ~me include estimated 
future paJllleDts. 
•• 
-/ Profits do not include the l.ncreued market value of 
retained Investments. 
Losses 
~(47.2%) 
______ 
Dividends 
(.1%) 
General Liability Insurance - Virginia 
Actual Distribution of 1985 Proceeds •, 
Exhibit 4 
-------LAX Other Expenses----
(20.1%) (4%) 
Dividends 
(.1%) ---
---Losses (14.9%) 
Profits ___ _ 
**/(60.9%) 
• 
-/ Proceeds Include premiums written plus realized 
Investment lneome • 
•• 
-/ Profits do not include the increued market Yalue of 
retained inYestments. 
